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ABSTRACT
Zhang, Hanshu. Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2019. Prevalence
visual search : optimal performance and the description-experience gap.
Real-world visual search differs significantly from the laboratory task. One distinct fea-
ture is that most targets in real-world visual search are low prevalence. Considering the im-
portant practical connections between the laboratory study and applied research, there has
been a resurgence in exploring prevalence effects on visual search performance, especially
the effect that targets are more likely to be missed when they have low prevalence. Though
there is a consensus that target misses are due to a liberal criterion, previous studies failed to
consider the potentiality of optimal performance from the perspective of Signal Detection
Theory, which also predicts a the liberal criterion shift. Moreover, previous decision mak-
ing literature has demonstrated that observers subjectively weighted the probability based
on the information communications they were given (i. e. the description-experience gap),
motivates the current study to explore how target probability communications influence
search performance.
To explore the hypothesis of optimal performance and the influence of probability com-
munications, the current research assessed observers’ performance from two aspects: be-
havioral performance and eye movements. The results indicated that with a high penalty
on miss errors, observers’ criteria were more liberal toward “target-present” responses.
However, the performance was not optimal as expected. The manipulation of informa-
tion indicated visual search was affected by the way the target prevalence information was
given to observers. Specifically, when target prevalence was low, learning prevalence from
experience resulted in the belief in more targets and longer search time before quitting
compared to the contexts in which observers had been explicitly informed about the target
probability. The observed discrepancy narrowed with increased prevalence and reversed
when target prevalence was high.
iii
There was no clear evidence for the same discrepancy in item fixation time. The ob-
served results were consistent with the previous study that the prevalence effects affected
the item fixation time and number of fixated/re-fixated items. However, only informa-
tion communications interacted with prevalence when accounting for number of re-fixated
items as hypothesized.
The demonstration that the information communications influence search performance
in the current research has implications for the experimental design of future prevalence
search studies and can also guide research on prevalence information learning in the future.
iv
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Introduction
Many real-world visual search tasks such as medical image evaluation and luggage screen-
ing are different from our familiar psychological laboratory-based experiments. One impor-
tant feature of many applied search tasks is that targets are not frequently observed, e.g. the
breast cancer detection rate is 5.1 per 1000 screening examinations (Lehman et al., 2016).
According to the record of Transportation Security Administration (2018), 3957 firearms
were discovered in carry-on bags of over 771.5 million passengers, which approximately
equals to one detected weapon per 200,000 passengers. Considering the practical impor-
tance of understanding search processes when targets are rare, there has been increasing
attention on prevalence effects in the visual search literature.
Most previous research hypothesized that human observers shifted their response cri-
teria biasing their responses more toward “target-present” or “target-absent” (see Horowitz,
2017, for a recent review), which was based on Signal Detection Theory (c.f. Green &
Swets, 1966). Many of these studies assumed that this “shift” caused the problem of miss-
ing target reports but failed to consider the possibility that in order to achieve high overall
accuracy, the criteria shift was optimal (c.f. Wickens, 2002). In addition to the failure of in-
cluding optimal performance discussion, the previous visual search studies did not take into
consideration that the communication of target probability can also affect search perfor-
mance. In the judgment and decision making literature, there was a major topic discussing
how people treat information about the probability of an outcome differently depending on
how that probability information is communicated. The current research addresses these
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two problems. The first goal is to examine if observers shift criteria with the intention to
perform optimally as the target prevalence changes. Second, I investigate how visual search
is affected by the way target prevalence information is provided to observers, specifically,
whether they received explicit information about prevalence or learned the prevalence from
experience.
The introduction has three parts: 1) I start with a brief description of prevalence effect
in visual search and a well-recognized model that explains the prevalence effect. Then,
I introduce the previous methods on ameliorating the prevalence effect. Next, I discuss
the optimal performance that most previous research fail to consider. 2) The second part
focuses on introducing theories of decision making and their implications on the research
into prevalence visual search. 3) For last part of the introduction, I discuss the innovations,
general method, and hypotheses of the current research.
1.1 Prevalence Visual Search
Kundel (1982) first proposed the idea of using predictive value to reflect the strong ef-
fect of disease prevalence on the detectability of a diagnostic test. Kundel (1982) pointed
out that as the prevalence decreased from 50% to .05%, the ratio of false alarms to hits
increased by 20 times. Therefore, without the context of prevalence information that de-
scribed the ratio of normal to abnormal images, the error or detectability rate alone was not
sufficient to describe how well radiologists can detect the abnormality. Two decades later,
Wolfe, Horowitz, and Kenner (2005) addressed the influence of prevalence on target search
in a psychological visual laboratory task. In their study, naive observers were instructed
to search for “tools” which showed up with different prevalence in an artificial baggage-
screening task. They found that when the prevalence went from 50% to 1%, the miss errors
increased from 7% to 30%. The findings by Wolfe et al. (2005) were then discussed further
in other visual search research (e.g. Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Rich et al., 2008; Wolfe et al.,
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2007). Since then, the prevalence effect refers to the phenomenon that rare targets are more
likely to be missed during visual search.
1.1.1 Dual-threshold model
Why do observers miss rare targets? One explanation is given by the dual-threshold model
by Wolfe and Van Wert (2010). The dual-threshold model consists of two components,
signal detection theory and a random walk model, to describe the perceptual criteria and
searching time separately.
Signal Detection Theory (SDT). Signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966)
assumes that the internal response to a target/distractor is sampled from an equal variance
Gaussian distribution (Wickens, 2002). The perceptual discriminability (d′) between the
two distributions determines how well observers can discriminate targets from distractors –
a larger d′ represents that observers can identify the targets better. By setting up a perceptual
criterion (λ), responses can be categorized into four different types (Table 1.1): correctly
identify a target (hit), falsely identify a distractor as the target (false alarm), correctly
reject a distractor (correct rejection), and fail to report a target (miss). The dual-threshold
model proposes that instead of a discrminability (d′) change, the perceptual criteria (λ)
shift changes with target prevalence. To be more specific, when target prevalence increases,
observers shift their conservative criteria in reporting “target-present” to liberal criteria that
biased to more responses in “target-present”, thus there are more hits and false alarms. In
contrast, if the prevalence is low, observers would hold liberal criteria thus producing more
miss errors.
Random Walk Model. The random walk model makes assumptions about how evidence
accumulates each step towards making a decision. The evidence is sampled over time until
a response threshold is reached. The dual-threshold model (Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010) as-
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Table 1.1: Responses in Signal Detection Theory
Target
Responses Present Absent
Present hit false alarm
Absent miss correct rejection
sumes that in a trial of responding “target-absent”, an accumulator starts at the start point,
which is sampled from a normal distribution of N(0, 0.5). For each step, The accumulator
takes a step, sampled from a normal distribution of N(1, 0.5), mimicking that an item is
selected by observers to decide whether it is a target or not. The simulated model has a
fixed maximum of 10 steps each trial until it reaches the threshold boundary, which be-
comes more conservative in reporting “target-present” as target prevalence increases. The
response times are converting from steps to millisecond by RT (ms) = Nstep × 120(ms).
Taking the two components together, the dual-threshold model hypothesizes that the
target prevalence affects both observers’ perceptual criterion and quitting threshold. When
the target prevalence is high, observers hold liberal criterion and make more “target-present”
responses which include both hits and false alarms, as well as increase the quitting threshold
so that the “target-absent” responses are slower. When target prevalence is low, observers
shift their criterion to have more and quicker “target-absent” responses by decreasing the
quitting threshold.
Beyond the findings that agreed with the shift of perceptual criteria and response quit-
ting threshold of response times (e.g. Ishibashi & Kita, 2014; Ishibashi, Kita, & Wolfe,
2012; Lau & Huang, 2010), there was also additional evidence that linked the dual-threshold
model to the eye movement results. Peltier and Becker (2016) analyzed observers’ eye-
movements during their search for high, medium, and low prevalence targets. They found
that as prevalence decreased, observers had shorter fixated time on targets while increased
their fixation time on distractors. Godwin, Menneer, Cave, Thaibsyah, and Donnelly (2015)
focused on the target-absent trials exclusively. They found that as the prevalence increased,
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the increase in time spent on each object was due to the increased number of items revisited.
Moreover, participants fixated more objects as prevalence increased.
1.1.2 Methods to moderate the prevalence effect
Fleck and Mitroff (2007) questioned the prevalence effect reported by Wolfe et al. (2005) by
positing that the miss errors were actually motor errors – observers responded too quickly
despite the fact that they knew a target was present. Therefore, they suggested that by
providing a second chance to correct the responses, the “misses” can be altered into “hits”.
However, the idea of “motor errors” was rejected by the replication study of Van Wert,
Horowitz, and Wolfe (2009). They demonstrated that the second chance for correcting the
responses only lowered miss errors marginally – about 2% in low prevalence and 1% in
high prevalence. Indeed, the second chance option worsened observers’ performance due
to the fact that more responses in correct rejections were modified into false alarms.
Admitting the existence of the prevalence effect, then the question is whether the
prevalence effect can manipulated. If the answer is yes – how can one manipulate it?
In alignment with the dual-threshold model, there are two different approaches that have
been taken. One is to try to shift the perceptual criteria to persuade subjects to make
more “target-present” responses thus increasing the hit rates. The other is to keep subjects
searching longer to eliminate the potential miss errors due to early search termination. This
section summarizes the previous efforts based on these two different aspects.
Liberal criteria
Wolfe et al. (2007) proposed the bursts of high prevalence solution in which high preva-
lence trials were inserted with feedback before low prevalence trials without feedback could
reduce miss errors in low prevalence trials. In another study with trained transportation se-
curity officers, Wolfe, Brunelli, Rubinstein, and Horowitz (2013) tested the method and
5
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found it was applicable in helping alleviate the prevalence effect in the field. There were
other efforts of persuading such as arbitrarily adding another target so that observers re-
ported more “target-present” trials or simply giving false feedback for target-absent trials
(Schwark, Sandry, MacDonald, & Dolgov, 2012).
However, persuading observers to report more “target-present” did not always lead to
optimal results. For example, Wolfe et al. (2007) reported that when observers were asked
to search for one of four targets, the hit rate for the “real” targeted item in low prevalence
increased. However, when asked to look for multiple targets, observers did not have better
performance compared to searching for a single target despite the fact that there were more
target present trials in general. On the other hand, if people were required to search for mul-
tiple targets, there was a possibility that the dual-target search led to another issue in which
observers simply miss the subsequent target after finding one (Fleck, Samei, & Mitroff,
2010). More importantly, if only focusing on “target-present” reports, observers may not
actively find targets but guess randomly instead (see related discussions of “prevalence-
based search”, Peltier & Becker, 2017b; Schwark, MacDonald, Sandry, & Dolgov, 2013).
Longer search time
To increase the quitting threshold, the direct way is to ask to observers search longer. As
I discussed in the previous section, the random walk model in the dual-threshold model
assumes that observers select one item and accumulate evidence on whether it is a target
or not, the miss errors can be caused by early search termination before even fixating on
the item. Taking the advantage of eye-tracking, Rich et al. (2008) found that misses were
caused by the fact that search was terminated without ever fixating the target. They showed
that the largest change when searching a target from a high prevalence context to a low
prevalence context was a decrease in the number of fixations on targets1.
1Though Rich et al. (2008) showed that there were high percentage additional errors (20%) due to the
prevalence transition from high to low, there were still more trials where targets were fixated compared to the
un-fixation rate (26%). Additionally, while reporting the proportion of fixation on targets, Rich et al. (2008)
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Unfortunately, longer search time were not effectively transformed into more hits re-
ports. Wolfe et al. (2007) made a simplified assumption that each item inspection needed
a certain amount of time so if observers terminated the trial faster than the time limit, they
were warned and required to make a second response. However, they reported that the ad-
ditional taken time did not offer accuracy benefits. Recently studies by Peltier and Becker
(2017a) and Drew and Williams (2017) also argued that informing observers of fixated and
un-fixated areas by employing eye-movement feedback failed to help improve the chance
of detecting the target.
1.1.3 Optimal performance and homo economicus search
The prevalence effect indicates that the low prevalence target is more likely to be missed.
However, from the perspective of maximizing the over accuracy, shifting criteria is appro-
priate to reduce false alarms. Therefore, the shifting could be a process of pursing optimal
performance for accuracy instead, which may explain why many previous efforts were in
vain.
Optimal performance. In addition to describing the perceptual criteria update in accor-
dance with the prevalence, SDT can also be utilized to quantify observers’ performance.
Another measurement, β, is the bias that describes the ratio of distractors/targets like-
lihood at the specific decision criterion λ (Equation 1.1). β equals the relative height of
the two distribution functions at the criteria β = fs(λ)/fn(λ). To maximize the correct re-
sponses of hits and correct rejections, the optimal strategy is to posit β based on the target
probability s (Equation 1.2).
log β = d′(λ− 1
2
d′) (1.1)
failed to include the details of fixation time.
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βoptimal =
1− s
s
log βoptimal = log
1− s
s
= −logit(s) (1.2)
When the prevalence s decreases, the optimal bias βoptimal which represents the ratio
of distractors/target responses increases. With a given perceptual discriminability d′, the
optimal strategy is to have conservative criteria and have more “target-absent” responses as
described in the dual-threshold model. Therefore, instead of shifting the criteria to inten-
tionally miss a target, the observers may actually be trying to maintain the high accuracy
from the trials of “correct rejections”.
Homo economicus search. Therefore, it is a dilemma to ask observers to act on the
liberal performance without imposing on the trade-off between false alarms and misses.
Moreover, in real-world search, even low prevalence targets should not be missed in the
scenario of airport security screening or radiologists search. To counteract the tendency of
conservative criteria, one possible solution is to have associated values with the responses.
Thus the optimal strategy is to adjust the response accordingly with the target probability
and responses’ gains or losses (Equation 1.3).
log βoptimal = log
V (correct rejection)− V (false alarm)
V (hit)− V (miss)
− logit(s) (1.3)
Given the fact of numerous failures in previous studies, it is quite fair to question
if prevalence effect is only the consequence of observers’ pursuing optimal performance.
Though there are fewer miss errors in the high prevalence condition, however, observers
are more likely to make false alarms (e.g. Ishibashi et al., 2012, Experiment 1, Figure 3).
Instead, by recalculating the accuracy provided in Peltier and Becker (2016), it is notable
that the low prevalence condition actually has the highest accuracy due to the high cor-
rect rejection rate: 94.82% (10%), 85.85% (50%), and 84.42% (90%) for each prevalence
9
condition. With the criteria and d′ in the reports of Wolfe and Van Wert (2010), there is
a clear trend that would be predicted if observers were trying to achieve the optimal bias
(Figure 1.2) 2.
If observers are capable of performing “optimally”, their response bias should update
if the associated values for responses encourage “target-present” based on the Equation 1.3.
However, in the pilot study reported by Wolfe et al. (2007), they found that changing payoff
matrices did not have a noticeable effect on miss errors. Nevertheless, Navalpakkam et al.
(2009) found that reward schemes can be designed to obtain desired detection rates for rare
targets. In effect, though Wolfe et al. (2007) argued that “it is hard to imagine how one
would simulate the real payoffs of an airport checkpoint or a radiology suite” (p. 624),
it is important be to aware that some targets are more critical than others in the search.
Nakashima, Kobayashi, Maeda, Yoshikawa, and Yokosawa (2013) compared novice and
radiologists’ search performance in detecting three lesions with different prevalence. They
found that radiologists had more misses in non-serious lesion targets compared to serious
ones whereas the differences were not detected in novices’ performance.
Taking the associated value into consideration, the likelihood of finding a target should
depend on its prevalence and associated value. The low prevalence target reduces its prob-
ability of being detected by the observers, and additionally, the important target should not
be missed.
More importantly, most prevalence visual search studies fail to focus on the fact of
prevalence itself considering the prevalence effect emphasizes heavily on the target prob-
ability. That is, different from the transportation security officers or radiologists who have
a general idea about target frequency, undergraduate students observers in computer-based
visual search tasks normally do not have a basic understanding about the event probabilities
of target-present trials they are about to search. In effect, most previous research did not
inform observers of prevalence information directly: Observers were either instructed that
2I sincerely appreciate Dr. Jeremy Wolfe for sharing the raw data for their research
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the target would appear “frequently”, “somewhat rarely”, or “very rarely” (e.g. Wolfe et
al., 2005) or given practice trials to estimate the prevalence probability rate (e.g. Peltier &
Becker, 2016).
1.2 Optimal Decision Making
While prevalence visual search research assumes that observers search optimally, in most
cases observers are not capable of behaving optimally when making choices in decision
making literature. In this section, I introduce in detail the normative and descriptive ap-
proaches in decision making, and the importance of event probability communication in
decision making with the introduction of the description-experience gap.
1.2.1 Normative approach
Theoretically, the optimal choice among different options is to select the one with the high-
est expected value (EV ). The expected value can be represented by each possible outcome
{x1, x2 . . .xn}, and its associated probability {p1, p2 . . . pn} (Equation 1.4). That is, com-
pared to a loss $32 with 10% probability (EV = −3.2), selecting the option of a certain
loss of $3 (EV = −3) should be a better choice. However, not all decision makers chose
options optimally. It turns out that people may have different weights for assessing the
value and probability (see Johnson & Busemeyer, 2010, for a review) .
EV =
n∑
i=1
pixi (1.4)
1.2.2 Prospect theory
Compared to the normative approach specifying the optimal option, the descriptive ap-
proach depicts how decision makers make decisions. The influential modification based
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on the subjective utility assumption is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theory introduces aspects from cognitive psychology
into perspectives of how humans making decisions. There are two well-known statements.
First, there is a decision weight based on a probabilities evaluation. Decision makers sub-
jectively overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate, medium and high prob-
abilities. And second, there is a concave function for gains and a convex function for losses:
outcomes should be valued differently based on gains or losses. Specifically, prospect the-
ory proposes the concept of loss aversion. Based on the assumption of loss aversion, the
subjective utility of losing $100 is larger than gaining it.
1.2.3 The description-experience gap
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2004) extended prospect theory and found that if de-
cision makers were instructed to sample from the outcome distributions and decide based
on that experience, their decisions from experience clearly differed compared to decisions
from description (Figure 1.3): rare events had less impact than they deserved. This dis-
crepancy is termed as the description-experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Indeed,
with choices from experience, people behave as if they underweight small probabilities
and overweight moderate and high probabilities, exactly the opposite prediction made by
prospect theory (Hertwig, 2012).
The Description-Experience Design Paradigm
There are three common paradigms employed in exploring decisions from experience: the
sampling paradigm, the full-feedback paradigm, and the partial-feedback paradigm (see
Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Erev, 2009, for a review). In the sampling paradigm (Figure
1.4a), decision makers sample as many outcomes as they like in the sampling stage before
they move on to choose the option they would prefer. For example, a descriptive choice
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Figure 1.3. The description-experience gap depicts that the subjective probability weight-
ing is different in deicisions from experience and description.
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between option A that loses $3 dollars for sure and Option B that loses $ 32 dollars with
10% probability can be presented in the sampling stage as Option A {-3, -3, -3, -3, -3, -3,
-3, -3, -3, -3} and Option B {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -32, 0, 0, 0}. In the full-feedback paradigm
(Figure 1.4c), there is no sampling stage. Decision makers get draw-by-draw feedback on
their choice and see the outcome had they chosen option. In the partial-feedback paradigm
(Figure 1.4b), decision makers are only able to see the draw-by-draw feedback they choose.
That is, in the partial-feedback, if decision makers choose Option A, they will lose $3
whereas decision makers would know the outcome for Option B is 0 had they chosen B in
the full-feedback paradigm.
A key characteristic in the paradigms is that decision makers need to explore and
exploit the distribution associated with each option. The goal of exploitation is to obtain
a desired outcome while in both the partial-feedback and full-feedback paradigm, decision
makers also need to accumulate the information during choosing. Additionally, the full-
feedback paradigm permits people to exploit and receive information of the payoff they
do not choose. Therefore, the strategy in the partial-feedback paradigm is to maintain a
balance between the demands of exploration and exploitation (Hertwig, 2015).
Explanation
Why is there a gap between choices from experience and description? The first suspicion
is small samples. In the sampling paradigm, decision makers need to sample outcomes
from the distribution before making decisions. It is possible that decision makers who do
not encounter the rare event are likely to underestimate its probability. For example, it
is possible that some decision makers never encounter the outcome of losing $32 before
choosing the option of losing $32 with 10% probability. Another possibility is recency,
that is, decision makers put more weight on the late observations than they deserve. The
third possibility is the reversal of probability weighting. As described above, decisions
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from experience lead to distinct probability-weighting patterns compared to decisions from
description. However, in a recent meta-analysis by Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, and Her-
twig (2018), it seems like not a single factor of the three can explain the gap, rather, the
largest determinant of the gap is reliance on small samples and the associated sampling
error.
The visual search task has different attributes compared to decision making, no ob-
servers have access to sampling trials before they start searching. Therefore, the influence
imposed by number of trials “sampling” in the judgement and decision-making research
does not apply in most visual search tasks. If observers need to accumulate the prevalence
information, the procedure of exploration and exploitation begins from the first trial. Then
both recency and reversal of probability weighting might contribute to the potential obser-
vation of description-experience gap in prevalence search. Here, instead of exploring the
question that whether missing a target has an effect on the subsequent trials, the current
research mainly focuses on the reversal of probability weighting.
1.3 Current Research
Given that there decision makers behave as if they weight subjectively on the event proba-
bility, observers in the visual search tasks may subjectively interpret the target probability
while they explore and exploit the trials. If observers believe the target probability is high,
they will search exhaustively among items and more likely to identify an item as the “tar-
get”, if they already find a lot and affirm
There are two goals of the current research. First, assuming that observers are trying
to shift the criteria to perform optimally, I explore whether associated values of responses
are able to actively bias observers or not. My second goal is to investigate how infor-
mation communication influences human search performance – specifically, whether the
description-experience gap can also be observed in the prevalence visual search task or
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not.
Previous prevalence visual search has discussed whether an “expensive” miss can mo-
tivate better performance (e.g. Wolfe et al., 2013). Though Navalpakkam et al. (2009) pro-
posed the employment of reward schemes to obtain the desired detection rate for rare tar-
gets, om my knowledge, there has been no exploration of the influence of reward schemes
on search performance so far to my knowledge.
On the other hand, previous research indicated indirectly on the importance of infor-
mation communication. For example, Evans, Birdwell, and Wolfe (2013) reported that
observers’ cancer detection rates were dependent on the search environment they were in.
In their study, Evans et al. (2013) asked expert radiologists to search the same set of mam-
mography cases in the daily clinical practice and laboratory settings. They found that when
radiologists viewed the mammography films together in the laboratory settings in which the
prevalence was 50%, they missed 12% of the cancers. However, they missed 30% of the
same set in their daily practice. The finding by Evans et al. (2013) corresponds to the previ-
ous discussion on the description-experience gap: Since radiologists did not “experience”
many cancer cases in their daily practice cancer mammography screening, rare events were
weighted as less influential than they deserved.
1.3.1 Theoretical innovation
Instructions on better performance
In accordance with the efforts to mitigate the prevalence effect, an important exploration in
the previous question is whether “cuing” or “false-instruction” can effectively improve the
observers’ performance. Beyond the efforts discussed in section 1.1.2, there are many other
explorations. For example, Lau and Huang (2010) offered observers trial-by-trial cues on
the “high”/“low” prevalence. They found that with mixed trial-by-trial cues, observers
responded based on their accumulated experience instead of the cued target prevalence in-
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formation. Ishibashi et al. (2012) also tested the explicit probability of cuing on observers
search performance and concluded that a descriptive prevalence cue was not a primary
source contributing to prevalence effect. Though both Lau and Huang (2010) and Ishibashi
et al. (2012) also tested the explicit probability of cuing on observers search performance,
both concluded that a descriptive prevalence cue was not a primary source contributing to
the prevalence effect. If observers were instructed that there was a high chance of seeing
the target, this lowered the perceptual criteria (Ishibashi & Kita, 2014). It is notable that
these previous studies explicitly focused on the trial-by-trial cues. Reed, Ryan, McEntee,
Evanoff, and Brennan (2011) instructed radiologists the wrong number of targets in detect-
ing pulmonary nodular lesions. They found that the number did not affect the radiologists
accuracy. Instead, the scrutiny time and the number of fixations increased with higher
prevalence expectations. In addition, the explicit information influence was more apparent
for normal images (Reed, Chow, Chew, & Brennan, 2014).
Though previous research has focused on how “instruction” impacted observers’ per-
formance, the “instruction” that observers received were quite complicated. For example,
in the study of Ishibashi et al. (2012), observers had to learn the relationship of the fixation
cue (“+” and “*”) to the probability of the target (“50%” or “extreme”). In another study
by Lau and Huang (2010), observers were told that the frame color indicated the likelihood
of the target but observers were actually misinformed in most of the blocks (6 out of 8).
In addition to the instructive cues, the designed conflicting cues are also against the
literature of the description-experience gap. Falsely phrasing a low-prevalence condition as
high prevalence can be decomposed into two parts: If observers followed the “over-stated”
probability instruction, they underweighted the described target probability as predicted by
the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); if they
explored the trials based on the accumulated experience, they underweighted the target
probability as predicted by the decision from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig &
Erev, 2009) as well.
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Previous research has shown that observers adjusted their performance accordingly
with the predication (e.g. Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010) as well as that the they acted differently
on explicit information (e.g. Lau & Huang, 2010), I expected that the “search experience”
and “given probability information” worked through the expectation as a mediating effect.
Observers set an expectation each time before the trial begins in how likely they are about
find the target before self terminate the trial. When the expectation is high, observers fell
“obligated” to find a target and thus spend more time on each trial in searching for the
target. On the contrary, when the expectations is low, observers terminate the trial sooner
with reporting “target-absent”.
Modeling the prevalence search performance
At the beginning of this chapter, I described the dual-threshold model and the previous stud-
ies that correspond with the model structure. Alternatively, the choice making and response
times can be modeled using the linear ballistic accumulator together (Brown & Heathcote,
2008). Same as the random walk model (section 1.1.1), the evidence accumulates until a
response threshold is reached. The difference is that unlike the random walk model, which
assumes variability for each “step”, the evidence in the LBA model accumulates linearly
and independently for each response (Brown & Heathcote, 2008).
As illustrated in the Figure 1.5, each response, e.g. “target-present” and “target-
absent”, starts at the start point from a uniform random distribution on the interval [0, A].
The responses then accumulate with a speed sampled from a normal distribution of mean
µ = v and standard deviation SD = sv. The accumulators continue until one of them
reaches the response threshold b. The first accumulator to reach the threshold determines
the response, correct or incorrect, and the time taken to the response threshold determines
the response time with the additional non-decision time t0.
The drift rate depends on whether the target is present or absent, the accumulators that
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Figure 1.5. The illustration of the LBA model
reach threshold then can represent all four outcomes. When the target is present and the
accumulator vpresent reaches threshold b first results in a hit. In contrast, when the target is
absent, and vpresent reaches threshold first this would produce a “false alarm”. Similarly,
when vabsent is the the first reach of to threshold b, it can either result in a miss or correct
rejection, depending on whether the target is present or not.
Therefore, fitting the prevalence visual search performance with the LBA model can
reduce the complexity of fitting response choices and times separately as in the dual-
threshold model. Further, the LBA model can also be used to inspect whether the response
times of misses and correct rejections slow down with increased prevalence by considering
two sources of information together.
1.3.2 General method
There are four manipulations in the current research: prevalence, information, rewards,
and salience. The first two manipulations directly explore the research question on the
influence of information communication while the rewards and salience are introduced for
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investigating the hypotheses of performance modeling.
Prevalence. The scope of the present study goes beyond the previous studies by not sim-
ply focusing on the low prevalence search performance. In the current research, observers
are instructed search for targets that are in 10%, 35%, 65%, and 90% prevalence sepa-
rately. Here, the use of 10% and 90% is to check the observers’ performance in low and
high prevalence. The examination of high prevalence echoes the concern of Horowitz
(2017) that “Most of the research on the prevalence effect has concentrated on low preva-
lence, typically in contrast to 50% prevalence. But high prevalence is also an important
consideration in many medical contexts.” (p. 96). Additionally, the middle range of target
prevalence (35% and 65%) helps reveal a more comprehensive finding that is comparable
to the decision making literature which has explored moderate probabilities.
Information. In order to investigate how observers perform on different prevalence in-
formation communications, observers are instructed to search for the target over trials
through two information levels – description and experience. The within-subject design
compares observers’ performance on two different search conditions to identify if there is a
“description-experience gap” in visual search that can be comparable to the decision mak-
ing literature as well. Specifically, in the description condition, observers are exclusively
informed about the prevalence probabilities (i.e. description-based search) whereas in the
experience condition, observers are expected to accumulate information through experi-
ence (i.e. experience-based search) from the feedback of trials.
Rewards. The current research includes neutral and penalty, employed in Navalpakkam
et al. (2009), to examine the assumption that observers are capable of performing opti-
mally, and shift their criteria accordingly with the different reward levels. In the neu-
tral reward scheme, observers receive equal penalty on both false alarms and miss errors.
In the penalty reward scheme, there is a severe penalty on miss errors compared to false
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alarms. When applying the reward schemes to the optimal performance, the reward ratio
(i.e. log[V (CR)− V (FA)]/[V (H)− V (M)]) in the neutral scheme is 0, thus the λoptimal
shifts accordingly with the prevalence s changes. On the other hand, in the penalty scheme,
the reward ratio is −2.96 thus it overrides the influence of prevalence changes as shown in
Figure 1.6. Therefore, because of the high penalty of miss errors in the penalty scheme,
observers are expected to have more liberal criteria which produce more “target-present”
responses than they are in the neutral scheme.
Table 1.2: Reward Schemes Adapted from Navalpakkam et al. (2009)
Correct Rejection False Alarm Miss Hit
Neutral +1 -50 -50 +1
Penalty +1 -50 -900 +100
Salience. The random walk model in the dual-threshold model (Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010)
makes a simplified hypothesis that faster responses in the quitting trials are led by the
decreased quitting threshold. Nevertheless, the model fails to include other potentialities
that can produce short response times for quitting trials. For example, in an eye-movement
study by Peltier and Becker (2016), they found that as prevalence decreased, the dwell times
on distractors decreased. Peltier and Becker (2016) proposed that such a finding can be
modeled as a shift in the start point in the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008)
instead of the threshold as proposed by the dual-threshold model3. Alternatively, short
responses can also be observed if the item inspection speed is fast (e.g. the drift rate vpresent
and vabsent in the LBA) for the low prevalence search condition. In the current study, the
salience is manipulated by the ratio of high discriminability/low discriminability distractors
to investigate the item processing speed. Overall, observers are expected spend more time
searching in the low salience trials compared to the high salience trials, indicating that the
3However, Peltier and Becker (2016) did not actually fit the model.
23
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
prevalence
op
tim
al
 β
Neutral
Penalty
Figure 1.6. The expected optimal β based on the two reward schemes adapted from Naval-
pakkam et al. (2009)
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low discriminability distractors are harder to identify.
1.3.3 Hypotheses
Behavior Performance
Signal Detection Criteria. The perceptual criteria λ in SDT are expected to shift based
on the prevalence changes. In addition, I hypothesize that observers will try to follow the
optimal criteria λoptimal,
λoptimal =
1
d′
[
log
(
v(CR)− v(FA)
v(H)− v(M)
)
− logit(s)
]
+
d′
2
.
Specifically, based on the findings of the decision-making literature as discussed in
section 1.2: When searching with the informed target probability, observers should over-
weight low probabilities and thus the criteria are more liberal towards to making more
“target-present” responses. In the high prevalence search condition, observers are ex-
pected to shift their criteria to report more “target-present”. However, because of the
informed target probability information, the criteria would be more conservative in re-
sponding “target-present” because of the subjectively underweighted prevalence informa-
tion (Figure 1.7a). When searching based on accumulated experience, observers are ex-
pected to underweight low probability which lead to conservative criteria (more “target-
absent” responses) and overweight high probability which produce liberal criteria (more
“target-present” responses; Figure 1.7b)4.
Response Times. Here, the response times on “target-absent” trials (i.e. miss and correct
rejection) will be analyzed as a proxy for the quitting threshold. Same as the perceptual
4The overweight and underweight can be conceptualized based on the the comparison between the actual
criteria and optimal criteria if observers opt to perform optimally as hypothesized
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criteria in signal detection, for response times in quitting trials, the overweighting should
also persuade observers to search more before the decision of “target-absent”. Therefore,
when target prevalence is low, searching based on description would have a higher quitting
threshold than searching based on experience and hence slower miss or correct rejection
trials (Figure 1.8a). Similarly, when the target prevalence is high, searching based on the
experience should result in higher quitting threshold than searching based on description
and hence slower miss or correct rejection trials (Figure 1.8b).
Eye Movements
Compared to the rich literature of behavioral performance on the prevalence effect in visual
search, there are fewer explorations on eye movements during search. Since the hypothesis
of optimal performance only applies to the perceptual criteria in SDT, the focus of the eye
movements analysis is to examine if there is a description-experience gap in related eye
movements evidence as revealed in the previous findings 5.
Fixation time on items. I hypothesize that as prevalence decreases, the dwell time on
targets will decrease as will dwell time on distractors, same as the reports by Peltier and
Becker (2016). Additionally, the dwell time on targets and distractors interact with the
information levels with the assumption that probability weighting can be reflected through
the dwell time (Table 1.3). To be more specific, when the prevalence in low, the description-
based search condition should produce shorter dwell times as observers need less evidence
to identify the targets. When the prevalence is high, the experience-based search condition
should produce shorter dwell times then as observers subjectively weigh the target proba-
bility more. The same appeals to the dwell time on distractors, longer dwell time in low
prevalence and shorter dwell time in high prevalence when observers were instructed to
5To be consistent with the behavior performance analysis, the current study employed “response-present”
and “response-absent” to include responses of false alarms and misses instead of “target-present” and “target-
absent” trials that only include correct responses.
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search on description.
Table 1.3: Hypotheses of Fixation Time on Items
Fixation time
Prevalence Targets Distractors
High tdescription > texperience tdescription < texperience
Low tdescription < tdescription tdescription > texperience
Note. The hypotheses only apply to “target-present” responses only.
Number of item fixations and re-fixations. The description-experience gap, if it exists,
should be reflected in the item fixations and re-fixations (Table 1.4). For both of them,
searching when the prevalence is low in the description condition and high in the experi-
ence condition should generate more item fixations and re-fixations compared to the other
conditions. These hypotheses are derived from Godwin et al. (2015) that reported there
was an expected increase in items visited and revisited as the prevalence increased.
Table 1.4: Hypotheses of Number of Fixated Items
Number of fixated items
Prevalence Fixations Re-fixations
High Ndescription < Nexperience Ndescription < Nexperience
Low Ndescription > Nexperience Ndescription > Nexperience
Note.The hypotheses apply to “target-absent” responses only
Search errors. In addition to the results of eye movements, it is possible for the current
study to examine if false identifications relates the hypothesized shorter fixation times on
the target. I expect that the miss errors are produced by either no fixation on the target
or not long enough fixations. As discussed before in the dual-threshold model by Wolfe
and Van Wert (2010), the random walk model assumes that each time one item would
be selected and then determined whether it is a target or not within the context of SDT.
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Therefore, the search errors can be generated from two sources: false identification and
early termination. The previous research by Rich et al. (2008) examined the breakdown of
errors across the different miss categories and concluded that the increase of miss errors
in the low prevalence conditions were due to early termination before ever fixating the
targets. However, the false identification in SDT fails to connect with the item fixation
time as discussed in the medical image perception research, which sorts errors in to three
categories: sampling error, recognition error, and decision making error (Nodine & Kundel,
1987). In short, sampling error refers to the error that the target is never fixated, recognition
error means that the target is fixated but not long enough to be recognizable, and decision
making error occurs when the target is detected but misidentified. Thus it is essential to
address the search error with additional evidence of item fixation time.
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Methods
2.1 Participants
To be comparable with the previous research of Wolfe and Van Wert (2010), the current
study had 22 observers (Age: 18 ∼ 59; Female: 13) who participated in the whole study.
Two observers whose performance was lower than 50% accuracy were excluded from data
analysis. All observers reported having normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and
no difficulty understanding English. Participants were compensated with $40 for finishing
all four sessions and were motivated by receiving $20 as extra bonus for top 15% search
performance based on points they achieved defined by overall reward schemes.
2.2 Stimuli
The experiment was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). Stimuli were a field of
elements randomly positioned on the screen. Participants were instructed to find the target
“T” among various asymmetical distractor T’s as accurately and quickly as possible (See
Figure 2.1). Each search array consisted of 25 items. Each item subtended 1◦ × 1◦ visual
angle (VA). The perceptual discriminability between targets and distractors was controlled
by distance of the crossbar away from the center (offset VA 0.08◦ ∼ 0.2◦). The trial salience
was manipulated by the ratio of high/low discriminability items. In a high salience trial, the
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Figure 2.1. Stimuli were a field of elements randomly assigned on the screen. The example
given was a target present trial in which the target was circled for displaying purpose. The
trial was also featured as low salience that more low salience discriminability distractors
were presented.
high perceptually discriminable distractors (offset VA 0.125◦ ∼ 0.2◦) were twice as likely
to show up as the low perceptually discriminable distractors (offset VA 0.08◦ ∼ 0.11◦),
and vise versa for a low salience trial. The stimuli were presented on a 20” monitor with a
resolution of 1600× 1200 pixels and a refresh rate of 85Hz. Observers viewed the stimuli
at a distance of 90cm.
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2.3 Procedure
2.3.1 Eye-tracker set up
Eye movements were tracked using an EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker at a 500Hz sampling
rate and only the right eye was recorded. Observers were required to use a chin rest to
stabilize head position and asked to move their heads as little as possible. Before the
experiment started, the eye-tracker was calibrated using a 9-point calibration routine. After
each block, observers were required to take a break and then performed the calibration
routine again before returning to the task. Each trial started with a fixation cross in the
middle of the screen and only after the computer detected fixating the cross (2.5 VA of
center), the trial would start. If the computer failed to detect fixation on the cross, the
observers were required to perform the calibration routine again.
2.3.2 Behavior experimental procedure
The study consisted of four sessions, combining two different search conditions (i.e. expe-
rience/description) and two different reward schemes (i.e. penalty/neutral; see Table 1.2).
Figure 2.2 depicts the basic trial structure. Each trial began with a cross in the middle
of the screen. The trial started after the computer detected observer’s fixation on the cross.
The stimulus was presented on the screen and and observers were asked to respond by
clicking the mouse to indicate if the target was present or not. If observers responded that
the target was present, they were then asked to verify the location the target by clicking on
the position where they found the target. If observers responded “target-absent”, the trial
would end. Observers received feedback and reward outcomes in points after each trial.
In particular, observers were given details of their incorrect responses: responding target-
present in a target-absent trial or identifying the wrong item in a target-present trial (i.e.
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Figure 2.2. Procedure of a single trial. Each trial is same in both experience- and
description- based search conditions. The difference is that participants know block preva-
lence information in description-based search.
false alarm) 1, or responding target absent in a target present trial (i.e. miss). Observers
were instructed to respond as fast and accurate as possible and were told the trial would
end after 15 seconds. Thus not being able to respond within the time constraint led to extra
penalized points (i.e. twice points of miss in the reward schemes).
Each session shuffled 4 blocks with target prevalence randomly selected from 0.1,
0.35, 0.65, and 0.9 (Figure 2.3). Each block included 80 trials with a fixed random presen-
tation sequence. The fixed random presentation was to avoid the potential issue of sampling
error (e.g. Fox & Hadar, 2006) so that the observed psychological phenomenon was not due
1The reward schemes took responses of identifying a wrong item in the target present trials as false alarms.
I also analyzed the case when the responses were considered as hits (consistent with previous studies where
observers did not need to verify the target position) or misses, and found there were no qualitative changes in
drawing the conclusion.
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Figure 2.3. The experimental design of the current study, see text for details.
to the statistical variability generated by the positions of target present trials being different
across different blocks within observers. Being given explicit prevalence information in the
description condition might offer observers an expectation of prevalence in the experience
condition, thus all observers started with the experience session then followed by the de-
scription session and repeated the same sequence again in the third and forth sessions. In
the first experience session, observers were only informed that the probabilities of targets
were different in each block and that there were some blocks that included more targets
compared to other blocks. Observers either started with experience-penalty or experience-
neutral as the first session and then completed the remaining experience-description and
reward schemes as indicated in the top row of Figure 2.3.
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Results
3.1 Behavior Performance
3.1.1 Signal detection analysis
For the 20 observers who reached the accuracy criteria (i.e. 50% accuracy and better), three
additional observers’ data were excluded from the analysis due to their failure to discrimi-
nate targets from distractors for any given block (i.e. negative d′). The remaining seventeen
observers were estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical signal detection model (Rouder &
Lu, 2005) implemented in Stan (Stan Development Team, 2018). To interpret the Bayesian
SDT model, I described the posterior distributions as the estimation for the true perceptual
criteria. The posterior distributions were sampled based on the vague restrictions in as-
suming observers’ performance. In particular, I included 95% high density intervals (HDI;
Meredith & Kruschke, 2018) to illustrate the estimation of credibility.
An inspection of the salience manipulation showed that, at the group level, the high
salience trials had relatively higher perceptual discriminabilities (d′) than the low salience
trials across all subjects (Figure 3.1). Figure 3.2 shows the differences between the two
posterior distributions with the 95% HDI.
Figure 3.3 shows violin plots of the posterior group level criteria across reward lev-
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Figure 3.1. The group level perceptual descriminability (d′) in the salience manipulation.
els and information levels, marginalized over salience levels. Across reward levels and
prevalence levels, the observed criteria were higher (more conservative about indicating
target-present) than the optimal criteria.
Observed criteria became more liberal as the probability of targets increased from 0.1
to 0.65, however, the criteria in high prevalence (s = 0.9) was not clearly more liberal than
the moderate prevalence condition (s = 0.65), except in the description-neutral condition.
The high penalty for miss errors clearly led to more liberal observed criteria but did
not reach the optimal criteria as expected.
The posterior distributions over the amount the criterion changed from the description
condition to the experience condition within prevalence levels are shown in Figure 3.4.
Criteria tended to be more liberal in the experience condition for low prevalence and more
conservative with high prevalence. In the low prevalence condition, criteria in the descrip-
tion condition were larger (95% HDI: [0.14, 0.48]). Though the discrepancy decreased as
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d'high salience − d'low salience
Figure 3.2. The group level difference perceptual descriminability (d′) by the salience
manipulation.
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Figure 3.3. Criteria sampled from the posterior distribution in the Hierarchical Bayesian
SDT.
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Figure 3.4. The posterior between description criteria and experience criteria: λdescription−
λexperience. The shaded area represented 95% HDI.
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the target prevalence increased, description still led to the more conservative criteria for
both the moderately low and moderately high prevalence conditions. In the high preva-
lence condition, the effect of the “gap” was reversed: the criteria in the description were
more liberal (95% HDI: [−0.17,−0.39]). This cross-over interaction is an indication that
there was a description/experience distinction in this visual search task.
While observers’ subjective evaluation of target prevalence is not directly available
from these data, I calculated what the observers’ subjective prevalence would have been
if they set their criterion optimally using that subjective prevalence. This allowed a more
direct examination of hypotheses about the effects of our manipulations on subjective prob-
abilities:
logit(sweighted) = log
V (correct rejection)− V (false alarm)
V (hit)− V (miss)
− log β
Contrary to the prediction that weighted probability would be an “s” shape as pre-
dicted by prospect theory and an inverse “s” shape as predicted by the decisions from
experience, the results (Figure 3.5) indicated that observers underweigthed the target prob-
abilities across all sessions. Nonetheless, the cross-over interaction between prevalence
and information condition is again evident in these posterior distributions.
3.1.2 Response times
I interpreted the data analyses of response times and eye movements as the model com-
parisons that represented by Bayes Factor (BF). BF indicated the extent to which the data
support Model A over Model B. Here I adopted the discrete categories of evidential strength
summarize by Jeffreys (1961). For example, ifBF = 3, the observed data are 3 times more
likely to have occurred under Model A than Model B, thus there is moderate evidence for
Model A (see also Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). In the analyses of response times and eye
41
Figure 3.5. Implied probability weighting assuming optimal criteria (neutral reward condi-
tion).
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movements, I first reported the most likely model that compared to the baseline model only
included the intercept of subject variance. Then I reported the BF comparisons of the most
likely model to alternative models to report the relative evidence of the observed effect.
The effects of information levels, reward levels, prevalence levels, and distractor
salience on target-absent responses were examined using a Bayesian ANOVA (Morey &
Rouder, 2018). Posterior means and HDIs from the full model including all interactions
are shown in Figure 3.6. The model with the highest Bayes factor relative to a baseline
subject-only model included the main effects of information, reward, prevalence, salience
manipulation and an interaction between information and prevalence (BF > 7.62×10324).
There was anecdotal evidence (BF = 2.87) for the best model over the next best model,
which excluded the main effect of information and the interaction, and moderate evidence
(BF = 5.20) relative to the third best model that added the interaction between reward and
salience manipulations.
To summarize, observers searched longer with the increased prevalence in both in-
formation contexts. As expected, the low salience trials led to longer search time. The
differences in information levels were consistent with the SDT analysis in the previous sec-
tion: the more conservative criteria in the description condition corresponded with shorter
response times before quitting the trial in the low prevalence condition; in the high preva-
lence condition, the belief in more targets in the description condition resulted in longer
response time before quitting the trial.
3.1.3 LBA model fitting
The responses were fitted in the LBA model using the R package rtdists (Singmann, Brown,
Gretton, & Heathcote, 2018). The model fit assumed that each subset of data, which con-
sisted of different manipulations of information, prevalence, and reward had a separate
threshold boundary. For each boundary level, there were four different drift rate levels rep-
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Figure 3.6. The response times of missing and correct rejection (i.e. quitting responses).
Errors bars represented 95% HDIs sampled from the posterior distribution in the Bayesian
ANOVA including all factors.
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resenting salience levels (i.e. high/low) that conditioned on whether the target was present
or not. Then the responses were fitted to find the optimized parameters that maximized the
likelihood for the LBA model.
Unfortunately, as the group level posterior check in the Appendix B indicates, the
predicted responses did not match the actual observed responses. The predicted responses
were either two fast or deviated greatly from the correct/ incorrect choices. Therefore,
there is a possibility that the LBA model is not suitale for fitting the prevalence visual
search performance, at least in the current study.
3.1.4 Eye movements
For the 17 observers who had positive d′, only fixations between stimuli showing up and
clicking to respond were taken into the data analysis. Specifically, the item was considered
as “fixated” if the eye fixation fell within a 120 × 120 pixel (about 2◦ × 2◦ visual angle)
centered on the item. Fixations that were faster than 50ms were excluded from the data
analysis (Rich et al., 2008). For each trial, if the proportion of invalid samplers exceeded
50% – i.e. the observers had too many or too long eye blinks, or the eye-tracker failed to
track the eye during the trial thus take those samplers as “blinks” - the trials were marked as
“bad samplers”. Aggregating all trials of “bad samplers” for each subjects, two additional
observers were excluded for not having more than 50% trials (i.e. 40 trials) for any given
single block. For the remaining 15 observers, these “bad samplers” (about 0.5% of all
trials) were not included in the eye-tracking data analysis.
Item inspection. As discussed in the hypotheses, the fixation times on hit trials for
targets and distractors were analyzed separately. For item fixation time on targets, the
Bayesian ANOVA (Morey & Rouder, 2018) indicated that the most likely model included
the main effects of information, reward schemes, prevalence, salience manipulation, and
the interactions between prevalence and reward schemes, and prevalence and salience
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Figure 3.7. Fixation time on targets in hit trials. Errors bars represented 95% HDIs sampled
from the posterior distribution in the Bayesian ANOVA including all factors
(BF > 7.73 × 1045) . There was moderate evidence (BF = 4.47) of it against the next
best model, which excluded the main effect of salience manipulation and the interaction
between salience manipulation and prevalence, and similar evidence (BF = 5.62) against
the third best model, which excluded the interaction between prevalence and salience ma-
nipulation but not the main effect of salience.
Consistent with the previous study by Peltier and Becker (2016), there was a trend that
observers spent less time fixating targets with the increased prevalence conditions. Inter-
estingly, instead of observing the interaction between prevalence and information condition
as in the behavioral data, I found that participants were slower when they searched based
on experience compared to description, except the condition of neutral, high-salience at the
35% prevalence level. The low discriminability items overall resulted in longer fixation
times on targets except for the 35% prevalence level.
For item fixation time on distractors, the Bayesian ANOVA (Morey & Rouder, 2018)
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indicated that the most likely model included main effects of information levels, prevalence,
salience, and the interaction between prevalence and salience (BF > 5.97 × 1028). There
was moderate evidence (BF = 3.75) of it against the second best model, which excluded
the main effect of information levels, and stronger evidence (BF = 25.50) relative to the
third best model, which included the additional interaction between salience manipulation
and information levels.
Similar to the fixation time on targets, the best model for distractor fixation times
also indicated the main effect of prevalence. Moreover, the interaction between salience
manipulation and prevalence indicated that there was a clear influence of prevalence on the
low discriminability items. While the fixation times on high-salient distractors were rather
identical, the low-salience distractors were fixated longer as the prevalence increased.
Opposite from the hypothesis that there was a “gap” in the fixation time on items, nei-
ther most likely model of fixation time on targets nor on distractors included the evidence
supporting the hypothesis that item fixation time interacted with information levels.
Item fixations. Next, the number of items fixated and re-fixated was analyzed in the
quitting responses (i.e.miss and correct rejections). Particularly, the item was re-fixated if
there were two adjacent fixated items were not identical.1 The same item could be re-fixated
for more than twice.
The analysis used R package BRMS (Brkner, 2017, 2018) to compare all possible
models with the baseline model, which included the variance of subjects only. The best
model on the number of fixations only included the main effect of prevalence and reward
levels (BF = 3.19 × 1021). There was very strong evidence (BF = 52.97) of it favored
against the next best model with included an additional main effect of salience. There was
also approximately equal evidence (BF = 56.88) over the third model, which included an
additional main effect of information level.
1The eye-tracker may record two adjacent fixations landed on the same items
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Figure 3.8. Fixation time on disctractors in hit trials. Errors bars represented 95% HDIs
sampled from the posterior distribution in the Bayesian ANOVA including all factors
Figure 3.9. The number of fixated item in the responses of “target-absent” trials. Error bars
represented 95% HDIs sampled from BRMS including all factors
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Figure 3.10. The number of re-fixated item in the “absent”–response trials. Error bars
represented 95% HDIs sampled from BRMS including all factors
As for the number of re-fixated items, the best model included all main effects – in-
formation, reward, prevalence, salience – with the interactions between information and
reward, information and prevalence, and reward and prevalence, and the three-way interac-
tion between information, reward, and prevalence (BF > 3.59× 10305). There was strong
evidence of it against the next best model (BF = 14.31), which included the additional
interaction between salience and information, and even stronger evidence (BF = 22.28)
of it against the third best model, which included the other interaction between salience and
reward schemes.
To summarize the number of fixated and re-fixated items when observers quit search-
ing, the results indicated the main effect of prevalence, which was consistent with the pre-
vious study (Godwin et al., 2015): as prevalence increased, the number of fixated items and
re-fixated items increased. The hypothesized interaction between prevalence and informa-
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tion was included in the best model when accounting for the number of re-fixated items.
Specifically, due to the three-way interaction, there was a clear “description-experience”
gap in the penalty condition: experience led to more re-fixated items in the low prevalence
trials whereas description had more re-fixated items when the prevalence was high.
Search errors. For breakdowns of search errors, the hypothesis focused on whether tar-
gets were missed due to early termination or misidentification. First, to check the hypoth-
esis of early termination, all incorrect responses of target-present trials – observers either
missed the targets or falsely clicked on another item – were categorized based on whether
observers fixated on the target or not. The Bayesian analysis using BRMS (Brkner, 2017,
2018) indicated that there was only marginal evidence (BF = 2.11) to favor the model that
included the main effect of prevalence over the baseline model that only included subjects’
variance in predicting whether the target was fixated or not. Averaging across all manip-
ulations, there was strong evidence (BF = 5.94 × 10178) indicating that there were more
target-fixated trials than un-fixated trials in each prevalence condition.
To further distinguish between reported and un-reported targets when the targets were
fixated, all trials where observers fixated targets were labelled target-fixated trials to predict
the responses of “present” and “absent”. The results indicated that there was extremely
strong evidence favoring the responses on fixation time (BF = 4.33×10534), showing that
the fixation time on “target-absent” responses was shorter compared to when observers
correctly identified the target.
To summarize the explorations of search errors, the results were consistent with pre-
vious research that prevalence factors influence non-target fixations in the target-present
trials. However, not fixating targets was not a major reason for observers missing targets.
Instead, the fixation time on targets made a difference in determining whether observers
correctly identified targets or not.
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Figure 3.11. In the target present trials, the proportion of target that not been fixated in
each condition. The number of trials within each condition was indicated inside the trian-
gle/circle.
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Figure 3.12. The distribution on targets of observers responding “target-present” and
“target-absent” trials where the targets were fixated in the trial.
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General Discussion
When to terminate the search? Observers should not spend all time hanging on one trial
(especially in the current study there were forced to make a choice) and they were not
supposed to skip the trials either. The current study demonstrated that the increased time
were due to the re-fixated items. When asked to search for a target, observers need to make
decisions on when to give up.
The current study systematically examined whether associated values of target re-
sponses and target prevalence information – receiving explicit information about preva-
lence or learning prevalence from experience – had an influence on observers’ visual search
performance. In the behavioral data analysis, the results indicated that observers shifted
their criteria from conservative to liberal as target prevalence increased (i.e. more reports
in “target-present”), which were consistent with previous results by Wolfe and Van Wert
(2010) and other follow-up findings (e.g. Hout, Walenchok, Goldinger, & Wolfe, 2015;
Peltier & Becker, 2016). The criteria were more liberal in the reward condition, which
miss errors were penalized severely. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the imposed
associated values on search responses did not successfully persuade observers to achieve
optimal performance. In addition to the criteria shift, the Bayesian signal detection analysis
clearly indicated that explicit knowledge of target prevalence led to different performance
compared to knowledge that is built upon accumulated evidence through trial feedback.
The discrepancy also interacted with prevalence, showing that explicit knowledge about
high and low target prevalence had different influences on search performance.
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The results of the eye movements agreed with the previous explorations in general
(e.g. Godwin et al., 2015; Peltier & Becker, 2016). The current study observed the main
effect of prevalence on fixation time and number of fixated items. However, unlike the cri-
teria and response times, the expected interaction between prevalence and eye movements
was only observed for the number of re-fixated items. Therefore, it is possible that the
observed description-experience gap in quitting response times was due to reconfirmation
(re-fixation) of items.
4.1 Optimal Search Performance
Though the current study created a competitive scenario in which observers would receive
extra rewards if they were top performers, observers never achieved optimal performance
based on the reward settings and prevalence information. This is different from the re-
ports in Navalpakkam et al. (2009) that observers quickly obtained the optimal criteria.
The results did reveal the influence of reward schemes on the perceptual criteria, response
times, target fixation time, as well as number of fixated and re-fixated items. By penalizing
the miss errors in the penalty condition, observers shifted their criteria to produce more
“target-present” responses. Nevertheless, the shift did not match the expected optimal per-
formance, or alternatively, as indicated in Figure 3.5, observers underweighted the target
probability in both information communication methods.
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4.2 The Description-Experience Gap in Prevalence Visual
Search
4.2.1 Behavior performance
Based on the decision making literature, whether people behave as if they overweight or
underweight the event probability depends on whether the choice is made with known prob-
ability or with the experience from exploration and exploitation (e.g. Hertwig et al., 2004;
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In the current research, the results indicated a pattern distinct from
that found in risky decision making: Observers subjectively underestimated the probabil-
ity of a target across a wide range of prevalence levels and conditions. More importantly,
the findings showed that the gap between visual search based on described probabilities
and visual search based on experienced probabilities, mirroring the description-experience
gap in risky decision-making. In the low prevalence conditions, observers were willing to
search longer and were more biased to respond affirmatively when they learned the preva-
lence from experience alone relative to when they were given the true prevalence. Bias and
response time differences between the description and experience conditions were muted in
the moderately high and low prevalence blocks. In the high prevalence conditions, the pat-
tern was opposite the pattern in the low prevalence block: Observers searched for less time
and were more cautious about responding affirmatively when they learned the prevalence
from experience alone relative to when they were given the true prevalence.
4.2.2 Eye movements
For eye movements, unlike the strong evidence indicated in the behavioral performance
data, the discrepancy in information levels only interacted with prevalence when accounting
for number of fixated items. As for other discussed dependent variables in the current study,
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most results were consistent with previous findings. The evidence needed to identify and
verify the targets decreased with increased prevalence, accompanied by shorter fixation
times, similar to the findings of Peltier and Becker (2016). When prevalence increased,
there were more re-fixated items as well, which are consistent with previous reports of
Godwin et al. (2015).
On the other hand, there were minor differences in the eye movement data of the
current study compared to previous research. The study of Godwin et al. (2015) found that
observers fixated about 20% objects on the target-present trials and approximate 50% to
60% objects on the target-absent trials whereas in the current study, a larger proportion of
items were scrutinized for each trial. Peltier and Becker (2016) reported the dwell time on
targets was over 400ms while the dwell time on distractors was slightly shorter. Though
Godwin et al. (2015) only reported single fixation duration, the duration was below 250ms
for both target-present and target-absent trials. For the current study, the fixation time
on target was between 1500ms to 2500ms (Figure 3.7) and about 300ms to 400ms on
distractors (Figure 3.8), both were longer than the previous reports with excessively long
fixation time on targets. It is noticeable that the long fixation time cannot be equalized to
the identification and verification time, it is valuable for a future study to test the single
item judgement for evaluating eye fixation and response times jointly.
The current study also tested search errors, which has been discussed thoroughly in
visual search and medical image perception. Contrary to most common thought that the
misses were due to early termination (Rich et al., 2008), the proportion of target-fixated
trials in the current research revealed that the increased prevalence did not necessarily lead
to more targets that observers failed to fixated. Instead, it is reasonable to doubt that the
short fixation time on targets result in the difficulty in identifying targets based on the find-
ings that most item were fixated. In the current research, I found that missing a target was
not because of a lack of fixation but rather the target fixation time. The insufficient fixation
time gives one possible explanation for recent research (Drew & Williams, 2017; Peltier
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& Becker, 2017a) that argued eye movements aided feedback failed to alleviate misses by
pointing out the fixated and un-fixated area, which emphasized most on whether the search
area was fixated or not. The eye movement results also proposed the potential usage of
fixation time on items to improve the detection rate. In an earlier study by Krupinski, No-
dine, and Kundel (1998), radiologists were asked to take a second look at the searching
areas with 5◦ circles outlining the locations where radiologists fixated for a long time at
their initial inspection. They found that hits increased while false alarm rates decreased by
giving the second chance. Though there is a need for further explorations, the current study
demonstrated that long fixation times on items is sufficient for correct identification.
Here, the current study systematically examined the effect of how prevalence informa-
tion is communicated, demonstrating that observers had different interpretations of target
prevalence and the way information was communicated had an essential role interacting
with prevalence search performance. There has been conflicting evidence on how observers
interpret explicit expectation in the previous research of prevalence visual search and med-
ical image perception. For example, in the discussion whether explicit expectation has an
influence on visual search performance, Reed et al. (2011) and Lau and Huang (2010) held
two different views in terms of the expectation influence (see also Wolfe, 2011). There are
also different opinions on whether eye movement feedback improves performance (Drew
& Williams, 2017; Krupinski et al., 1998; Kundel, 1982; Peltier & Becker, 2017b). As for
implicit knowledge, Horowitz (2017) reviewed previous research and noted that prevalence
expectations were developed over a window of 20-50 trials. Another study by Ishibashi et
al. (2012) found that observers were actually quite accurate in estimating prevalence. In
the current study, I did not explicitly test how observers update their expectation of target
prevalence over the trial-by-trial feedback. Instead, the gap shows that by aggregating each
block, there is still a consistent discrepancy in observers’ search performance. Though the
current research did not focus on discussing the learning process from explicit and implicit
knowledge about target prevalence for observers, the demonstration that the information
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communications influence search performance can guide the direction for future research
on prevalence search learning.
4.3 Limitations and Future Research
Unlike Navalpakkam et al. (2009), I did not find that observers were able to obtain the op-
timal performance. One potential difference between the present study and that of Naval-
pakkam et al. (2009) is that Navalpakkam et al. employed a perceptual decision making
task, observers were asked to perform a simple task — detecting an oddly orientated line
— whereas in the current research, the task was more demanding, observers had to find a
symmetric “T” among various asymmetric items, which required them to correctly locate
and also identify the targets. Moreover, the previous research on decision criteria learn-
ing (c.f. Maddox, 2002) suggested that observers were more conservative in responding
“target-present” than the optimal criteria expected. Though visual search and perceptual
decision making tasks such as the length judgment of a bar have different characteristics, it
is still important for the future research to test the selective influence of payoff matrix and
prevalence (i.e. base rate) on search performance. Second, the current task did not provide
observers with updated competition results during the sessions. Thus observers may have
either lost track of successful strategies or failed to perceive the associated rewards as de-
signed. Thus a future study can explore if Equation 1.4 is testable within a visual search
context with a more direct monetary design: high (pay) × high (prevalence), high (pay) ×
low (prevalence), low (pay) × high (prevalence), low (pay) × low (prevalence)
Observers fixated longer on targets than on distractors. In addition, the analysis of
search errors showed that longer fixation time helped in correctly reporting the targets.
However, the long fixation time did not necessarily indicated that observers needed longer
time to accept the item as target than reject it. It would be valuable for the future study
to investigate the cognitive process for these “extra” fixation times. For example, future
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research can explore rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task in which observers see
a serial of quickly presented items and do not terminate search by their own. The RSVP
task simplifies the task into a perceptual decision and provides further explorations on the
relationship between fixation time and correct identification.
I tried to fit observers’ responses with the LBA model for a more simplified and con-
cise model compared to the dual-threshold model. However, the posterior check that com-
pared the predicted responses with the observed responses indicated that there was no ro-
bust fitting in LBA. Fitting the data within a Bayesian structure that restricts each parame-
ter with a prior distribution while keeping within-subject variance information (e.g. Annis,
Miller, & Palmeri, 2017) may result in better representative posterior predictions. Future
research can explore if the Bayesian LBA can represent data from Wolfe and Van Wert
(2010) and the current study for an alternative integrated response model.
4.4 Conclusion
The current study examined reward schemes and information levels on observers’ search
performance in the context of searching for a target with varying prevalence. The results
indicated that with a high penalty on missed errors, observers had liberal criteria that bi-
ased towards “target-present” responses. However, the performance was not optimal as
expected. The manipulation of information indicated that the search performance derived
from explicit target knowledge differed from the accumulated information gained through
experience in the behavioral performance of perceptual criteria and response times. There
was no clear evidence for the same gap in the item fixation time. However, the observed
search time discrepancy may be driven by the number of re-fixated items.
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Apendix A: LBA Code
1 library(rtdists)
2 # Henrik Singmann, Scott Brown, Matthew Gretton and Andrew Heathcote (2018). rtdists:
Response Time Distributions. R package version 0.9-0.
3 # the code was adapted from rtdist vignette(https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/
rtdists/vignettes/reanalysis_rr98.html#comparing-model-fit)
4 # import r data
5 mylba<-read.table("lbaData.txt",header=TRUE)
6 # lba responses: 1 == correct, 2 == incorrect
7 mylba$Response <- 2- mylba$Correct
8 # lba drift rate: 1 == target present 2== target absent
9 mylba$Target <- 1+ 1*(mylba$TargetX=="None")
10 # lba boundary: information x prevalence x reward
11 mylba$boundary<-with(mylba,paste(mylba$Condition,mylba$Block,mylba$Reward, sep="_"))
12 mylba$boundary <- factor(mylba$boundary)
13
14 # lba density function
15 ll_lba<- function(pars, data, salience){
16 v_pars <-grep("ˆv",names(pars),invert=F,value=F)
17 density <- c()
18 for (i in 1:2){ #1 high salience; 2: low salience
19 for (k in 1:2){ #1: present 2: absent
20 subdata <- data[data$trialSalience==levels(salience)[i] & data$Target==k,]
21 d<- dLBA(
22 rt=subdata$RT, response=subdata$Response,
23 A=pars["a"],b=pars[’b’],t0 = pars["t0"],
24 mean_v = c(pars[v_pars[(i-1)*2+k]],
25 1-pars[v_pars[(i-1)*2+k]]),
26 sd_v = pars["sv"], silent=T,distribution="norm"
27 )
28 density<-c(density,d)
29 }
30 }
31 if (any(density==0)) return(1e6)
32 else return(-sum(log(density)))
33 }
65
34 #initiated parameters
35 get_start<-function(n_drift = 4){
36 start1<-c(a = runif(1, 0.5, 3),
37 sv = runif(1, 0.5, 1.5),
38 t0 = runif(1, 0, 0.5))
39 v <- runif(n_drift,0.5,3)
40 names(v)<- paste(rep(c("v_h","v_l"), each=2), rep(c("present", "absent"),2), sep="-")
41 b <- runif(1,0.5,3)+start1[’a’]
42 names(b)<-’b’
43 c(start1,v,b)
44 }
45 n_fits = 20
46 df_fit<-c()
47 n_subj <- unique(mylba$Subject)
48 #loop through each condition
49 b_levels <- levels(factor(mylba$boundary))
50 for (sj in n_subj){ #each subjects
51 for (bl in b_levels){ #each boundary
52 sbj_data <- subset(mylba,mylba$Subject==sj & mylba$boundary == bl)
53 #exclude outliers
54 sbj_data <- subset(sbj_data, RT > quantile(RT, 0.025) & RT < quantile(RT, 0.975) )
55 best_fit <- list(objective=1e+06)
56 for (i in 1:n_fits){ #get the best fit through 20 fits
57 start_ll = 1e+06
58 while (start_ll == 1e+06){
59 start <- get_start()
60 start_ll <- ll_lba(start, data = sbj_data,salience=factor(sbj_data$trialSalience
))
61 }
62 cat("\n Start fitting. \n")
63 fit <- nlminb(start=start, obj = ll_lba, data = sbj_data, salience=factor(sbj_data
$trialSalience),lower=c(rep(0,3),rep(-Inf,4),0))
64
65 if (fit$objective < best_fit$objective) best_fit<-fit
66 }
67 sbj_fit<-best_fit$par
68 sbj_fit[’sbj’]<-sj
69 sbj_fit[’b_levels’] <- bl
70 df_fit<-rbind(df_fit,sbj_fit)
71 }
72 }
66
Apendix B: LBA Posterior Results
67
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.1_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.35_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.65_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
description_0.9_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_neutral_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_neutral_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_neutral_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_neutral_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_penalty_h_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_penalty_h_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_h
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_penalty_l_absent
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.a
bs
en
t, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.a
bs
en
t)
, t
0 
=
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.1_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.35_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.65_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
0 5 10 15
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
experience_0.9_penalty_l_present
x
pL
B
A
(r
t =
 x
, r
es
po
ns
e 
=
 1
, A
 =
 a
, s
d_
v 
=
 s
v,
 m
ea
n_
v 
=
 c
(v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
, 
   
 1
 −
 v
_l
.p
re
se
nt
),
 t0
 =
 t0
, b
 =
 b
)
correct
incorrect
predict
actual
